




EXPLORING THE ASPECTS OF LAW’S “GOODNESS”  
IN RONALD DWORKIN’S CRITIQUE OF THE  
STRONG NATURAL-LAW THEORY






The scope of this paper is to explore certain aspects of Ronald Dworkin’s critique 
of the so-called “strong” natural-law theory. The author focuses on those aspects of 
Dworkin’s critique that gravitate toward the perspective of law’s “goodness”, namely, 
the question of how and to what extent Dworkin and the “strong” natural-law 
theory, each in its own way, allow the overlap between the concept of law and the 
evaluative viewpoint according to which substantive aspects of human moral good 
are pertinent to legal issues. In the first section of the paper, the author presents 
the central arguments of Dworkin’s legal theory by highlighting those theoretical 
elements that are often considered to be similar to the claims of the natural-law 
theory in a broad sense. The author then presents Dworkin’s main objections to the 
“strong” natural-law theory, as well as the evaluation of Dworkin’s “minimalist” 
natural-law account through the lens of the proponents of the “strong” theory. In 
the last section, the author analyses certain aspects of law’s “goodness” that have 
remained mostly implicit or underdeveloped in the debate between Dworkin and 
the “orthodox” natural lawyers. 







legal	rules	–	substantively	good?	Is	law as it ought to be	somehow	already	inbuilt	











conception	of	 law’s	goodness.	From	 legal	positivism	to	 recent	endeavours	of	
the	artefactual	 legal	 theory4,	 law	 is	conceptually	or	ontologically	envisioned 
1	 See	Hart,	H.	L.	A.,	Introduction,	in:	Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy,	Oxford	Uni-






understood	as	that which legally ought to be	or	“that	which	conforms	to	a	social	norm;	
and	if	law	is	defined	as	norm,	then	this	implies	that	what	is	lawful	is	‘good’”.	See	
Kelsen,	H.,	Pure Theory of Law	(translated	by	M.	Knight),	The	Lawbook	Exchange,	
Ltd.,	Clark,	New	Jersey,	2005,	p.	66.
3	 According	to	Joseph	Raz’s	account	of	purely	systemic	moral	properties	of	law,	the	
only	necessary	connection	between	 law	and	morality	amounts	 to	 the	claim	that	
law,	 envisioned	 at	 the	 level	 of	 an	 abstract	 institution,	 has	 the	 essential	 task	 to	
secure	a	 state	of	affairs	wherein	certain	moral	goals	–	 like	having	a	coordinated	
structure	of	authority	–	are	realized	that	could	not	have	been	(or	would	be	unlikely)	
achieved	without	it.	See	Raz,	J.,	About Morality and the Nature of Law,	in:	Between Au-
thority and Interpretation: On the Theory of Law and Practical Reason,	Oxford	University	
Press,	Oxford,	2009,	pp.	178	–	179.
4	 For	example,	see	Burazin,	L.;	Himma,	K.	E.;	Roversi,	C.	(eds.),	Law as an Artifact,	
Oxford	University	Press,	Oxford,	2018.	See	also	Burazin,	L.,	Can There Be an Artifact 
Theory of Law?,	Ratio	Juris,	vol.	29,	no.	3,	2016,	pp.	385	–	401.
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exclusively	as	a	source-based	–	i.e.,	essentially	identifiable	through	socially	re-
cognized	legal	sources	–	social	fact	or	artefact.	This	means	that	law	(what law 





















as	his	qualification	of	the	link	(“in	some	way”)	between	law as it is	and	law as 








as	a	natural-law	theory,	see	Lyons,	D.,	Moral Limits of Dworkin’s Theory of Law and 
Legal Interpretation,	Boston	University	of	Law	Review,	vol.	90,	no.	2,	2010,	pp.	595	–	
602;	Priel,	D.,	Description and Evaluation in Jurisprudence,	Law	and	Philosophy,	vol.	29,	
no.	6,	2010,	pp.	633	–	667.	





















2. A DWORKINIAN ACCOUNT OF LAW’S “GOODNESS” AND ITS 











9	 Dworkin,	R.,	Justice in Robes,	The	Belknap	Press	of	Harvard	University	Press,	Cam-
bridge,	 2006,	 p.	 178.	 Emphasis	 added.	 A	 conception	 of	 legality	 is,	 according	 to	
Dworkin,	“a	general	account	of	how	to	decide	which	particular	claims	of	law	are	
true”.	Ibid.,	p.	170.	It	may	be	said	that	“legality”	denotes	the	juristic	phenomenon	
at	 the	highest	 level	of	analysis,	 caught	 in	 its	axiological	perspective	of	 the	point	
for	having	law	as	an	institution	and	as	a	practice	at	all,	while	also	embracing	law’s	
concrete	social-factual	instantiations.	See	ibid.,	pp.	168	–	171.	


























10	 Dworkin,	R.,	Justice for Hedgehogs,	The	Belknap	Press	of	Harvard	University	Press,	
Cambridge,	2011,	p.	402.	Emphasis	added.
11	 Dworkin,	R.,	A Matter of Principle,	Harvard	University	Press,	Cambridge,	1985,	p.	11.
12 Ibid.













































































24	 See	Dworkin,	op. cit.	(fn.	13),	pp.	84,	340;	Dworkin op. cit.	(fn.	7),	p.	165;	Dworkin,	




25	 Dworkin,	op. cit.	(fn.	5),	p.	243;	Dworkin,	op. cit.	(fn.	9),	pp.	54,	189	n	5,	247	–	248.
26	 Dworkin,	op. cit.	(fn.	5),	p.	266.













ment	of	natural-law	theory	–	namely,	that	what the law is (i.e.,	the	content	of	law)	
depends	in	some	way	on	what the law should be (i.e.,	on	the	best	political-moral	




















officials.	See	Dworkin,	op. cit.	(fn.	9),	pp.	55,	68;	Dworkin, op. cit.	(fn.	7),	p.	166.
30	 Dworkin, op. cit.	(fn.	7),	p.	166.	
31 Ibid.,	p.	165.
32	 Dworkin, op. cit.	(fn.	10),	p.	329.	See	also	Dworkin, op. cit.	(fn.	13),	p.	xi;	Dworkin,	
R.,	Rights as Trumps,	in:	Waldron,	J.	(ed.),	Theories of Rights,	Oxford	University	Press,	
Oxford,	1984,	p.	153.
33	 Dworkin, op. cit.	(fn.	11),	p.	2.
34	 Dworkin, op. cit.	(fn.	13),	pp.	22,	82,	90	–	94,	294;	Dworkin, op. cit.	(fn.	11),	pp.	2-3,	
11;	Dworkin,	R.,	op. cit.	(fn.	32),	p.	166.
35	 Dworkin, op. cit.	(fn.	13),	pp.	xi;	294;	Dworkin,	R.,	op. cit.	(fn.	32),	p.	166.









the	premises	of	his	 legal	 theory,	he	 first	distinguishes	 and	 stratifies	 various	
























36	 Dworkin, op. cit.	(fn.	24),	p.	263;	Dworkin, op. cit.	(fn.	11),	pp.	3,	75.
37	 Dworkin, op. cit.	(fn.	5),	pp.	102	–	104;	Dworkin, op. cit.	(fn.	10),	pp.	410	–	412.
38	 Dworkin, op. cit.	(fn.	13),	pp.	xi	–	xii.



























40	 Dworkin, op. cit.	(fn.	11),	p.	205.	See	also	Dworkin, op. cit.	(fn.	5),	pp.	173	–	175.
41	 Dworkin, op. cit.	(fn.	13),	p.	xii.	
42 Ibid.,	pp.	272	–	273.






Rawls,	J.,	Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,	Philosophy	and	Public	Affairs,	
vol.	14,	no.	3,	1985,	p.	236.	
44	 Dworkin, op. cit.	(fn.	13),	p.	xv;	Dworkin, op. cit.	(fn.	10),	p.	330.
45	 Dworkin, op. cit.	(fn.	5),	pp.	95	–	96.	



































46	 See	Dworkin, op. cit.	(fn.	5),	p.	98.
47	 Dworkin, op. cit.	(fn.	13),	p.	47.
48	 Dworkin, op. cit.	(fn.	24),	pp.	265	–	266.











treat law as a part of political morality”.53
Hence,	there	is	one	plausible	way	to	treat	the	questions	such	as	“what	rights	
do	persons	have”,	“what	makes	the	community	flourish”,	“what	is	the	law	of	












of	the	law	are	true	in	a	given	case	at	a	given	time	–	and	defining law conceptually 
both	presuppose	the	complex	enterprise	of	interpretation	and	justification	of	
50	 Dworkin, op. cit.	(fn.	9),	pp.	10	–	12,	168	–	171,	221	–	222.	See	also	Dworkin, op. cit. 
(fn.	5),	pp.	87	–	89,	410	–	411.
51	 Dworkin, op. cit.	(fn.	9),	p.	31.	
52	 Dworkin, op. cit.	(fn.	10),	p.	401.
53 Ibid.,	p.	405.	Emphasis	added.	This	argument,	 from	Dworkin’s	2011	book	 Justice 





54	 Dworkin, op. cit.	(fn.	10),	p.	407.
55	 See	Dworkin, op. cit.	(fn.	9),	p.	145.
56	 Dworkin, op. cit.	(fn.	10),	pp.	401	–	402.
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enacted	rule-book	norms	against	the	backdrop	of	existing	rights	which,	in	turn,	
represent	moral	kinds	of	 reasons	 for	 action	because	 they	ultimately	 rest	on	
considerations	of	political	morality.57 























57	 See	Dworkin, op. cit.	(fn.	24),	p.	256.	See	also	Dworkin, op. cit.	(fn.	9),	p.	56.
58	 Dworkin, op. cit.	(fn.	7),	p.	165.
59 Ibid.	
60	 Dworkin, op. cit.	(fn.	5),	p.	102.
61	 Dworkin, op. cit.	(fn.	13),	p.	339.
62	 Dworkin, op. cit.	(fn.	13),	pp.	342,	344;	Dworkin, op. cit.	(fn.	5),	p.	35.
63	 Dworkin, op. cit.	(fn.	13),	p.	342.	Emphasis	added.
64 Ibid.,	p.	344.



































69	 Dworkin, op. cit.	(fn.	11),	p.	147.
70	 Dworkin, op. cit.	(fn.	13),	p.	xi.
71 Ibid.,	p.	177.
72	 See	Dworkin, op. cit.	(fn.	5),	p.	173.
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4. THE RESPONSE OF THE STRONG NATURAL-LAW THEORY: 
DWORKIN’S MINIMALIST “NATURALISM”





















73	 See	Dworkin, op. cit.	(fn.	10),	p.	327.






























75	 See,	for	example,	Finnis,	J.,	A Grand Tour of Legal Theory,	in:	Philosophy of Law,	op. cit.	
(fn.	73),	pp.	101	–	102,	107.
76	 Finnis,	J.,	Introduction,	in:	Human Rights and the Common Good. Collected Essays: Volume 
III,	Oxford	University	Press,	Oxford,	2011,	p.	11.
77	 Finnis,	J.,	The Nature of Law,	in:	Tasioulas,	J.	(ed.),	The Cambridge Companion to the 
Philosophy of Law,	Cambridge	University	Press,	Cambridge,	2020,	p.	51.
78	 Rodriguez-Blanco,	V.,	Law and Authority Under the Guise of the Good,	Hart	Publishing,	
Oxford,	2014,	pp.	176,	210	–	213.
79	 George,	R.	P.,	Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality,	Clarendon	Press,	
Oxford,	1993,	p.	85.
80	 Finegan,	T.,	Dworkin on Equality, Autonomy and Authenticity,	The	American	Journal	of	
Jurisprudence,	vol.	60,	no.	2,	2015,	pp.	143	–	180.















5. THE ASPECTS OF LAW’S “GOODNESS” IMPLICIT IN THE 















81	 See	Hittinger,	R.,	Varieties of Minimalist Natural Law Theory,	The	American	Journal	
of	Jurisprudence,	vol.	34,	no.	1,	1989,	pp.	144,	149	–	152.








































































87	 Dworkin, op. cit.	(fn.	5),	p.	97.








the	genesis	of	natural	 rights,	 see	Hervada,	 J.,	Critical Introduction to Natural Right 
(translated	by	M.	Emmons),	Wilson	&	Lafleur	Ltée,	Montréal,	2020,	pp.	7	–	30.	See	
also	Popović,	P.,	The Concept of “Right” and the Focal Point of Juridicity in Debate Between 
Villey, Tierney, Finnis and Hervada,	Persona	y	Derecho,	vol.	78,	no.	1,	pp.	65	–	103.
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90	 See	Dworkin, op. cit.	(fn.	9),	p.	145.
















that	his	objections	to	the	natural-law	theory	concern	the	full identification of all 
moral	and	legal	principles	in	determining	what	the	law	is.	
But	 I	 do	 not	 see	 how	 a	 value	 of	 political	morality	 can	 have	 immediate	
juridical	 relevance	and	constitute	an	essential	aspect	of	 the	very	concept	of	
law	–	on	the	sole	merit	of	a	moral	argument	–	and	escape	the	same	objection	











91	 See	Hervada,	J.,	Problemas que una nota esencial de los derechos humanos plantea a la filo-
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PREISPITIVANJE VIDIKA “DOBROTE” PRAVA U DWORKINOVOJ 
KRITICI “SNAŽNE” TEORIJE NARAVNOG PRAVA 
Cilj ovog rada preispitivanje je određenih vidika kritike američkog filozofa prava 
Ronalda Dworkina upućene “snažnoj” teoriji naravnog prava. Za žarišnu točku preispi-
tivanja autor je odabrao perspektivu “dobrote” prava, odnosno pitanje na koji način i do 
koje granice Dworkin i predstavnici “snažne” teorije naravnog prava, svatko u okvirima 
vlastitog pristupa, dopuštaju preklapanje pojma prava sa stajalištem prosuđivanja prava 
sukladno moralnim vidicima ljudskog dobra. U prvom dijelu rada prikazani su ključni 
argumenti Dworkinove teorije prava s naglaskom na one elemente zbog kojih se Dworkina 
često smatra predstavnikom teorije naravnog prava u širem smislu. Nakon toga predstavljene 
su temeljne tvrdnje Dworkinove kritike upućene “snažnoj” teoriji naravnog prava, s poseb-
nim naglaskom na Dworkinovo razlikovanje “snažne” teorije od njegova naravnopravnog 
pristupa. U nastavku su opisani osnovni smjerovi argumentacije kojima su predstavnici 
“snažne” teorije naravnog prava upozorili na otklon Dworkinova “minimalističkog” jus-
naturalizma od klasičnih postavki naravnopravne teorije. U posljednjem dijelu analizirani 
su vidici “dobrote” prava koji proizlaze iz predmetne rasprave, s naglaskom na određene 
manjkavosti Dworkinove kritike “snažne” teorije naravnog prava. Pritom se upućuje i na 
teorijske sastavnice prema kojima se, unatoč uzajamnoj kritici, ova dva pravno-filozofska 
pristupa mogu smatrati srodnima.
Ključne riječi: Dworkin, teorija naravnog prava, interpretacijska teorija prava, politička 
moralnost
